



PROPOSAL FOR AN EFFORT MANAGEMENT SCHEME IN THE KATTEGAT

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Author: Niels Wichmann

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Foreword

This proposal for an Effort Management Scheme for The Kattegat has been developed by a working group where the core members are Danish fishermen who have their daily fishery in The Kattegat.

A number of representatives from Danish authorities have participated in meetings on the proposal: The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, The Fisheries Directorate, and The Danish Institute for Fisheries Research.

WWF Denmark, and The General Workers Union (3F) have also participated and have given input to the proposal.

Furthermore representatives from The Swedish Fishermen's Federation have been involved in preparing the proposal.

The sole responsibility, however, for the proposal in its present form lies with the Danish Fishermen's Association.

1. BACKGROUND

- **For many years the European fishermen have been critical towards the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the EU. The CFP has not been sufficiently based on the factual realities of the sector, it has been entirely focussed on the stock situation for the various fish stocks.**

- The scientists (biologists) for obvious reasons have always had to work with a time-lag which has often had the effect, that the real stock situation could not be exploited commercially by the fishermen (e.g. sole in the Kattegat).
- Since the agreement on the CFP in January 1983 the discrepancies between the scientists' calculated stocks, and the fishermen's knowledge of the real stocks have widened. The fishermen have gradually lost confidence in both the scientific process, the advice given, and the general contents of the CFP.
- This lack of confidence has been further deepened by the recent years' addition of new rules and regulations. The policy has gone from an output system (quotas = allowable landings, not allowable catches!) to be an output system linked with an input system (effort = days at sea). An output system does not go hand in with an input system, both fishermen and other stakeholders and administrators agree on this.
- The sector's criticism and lack of confidence has led to a situation where:
 - the sector does not understand the fisheries policy
 - when the sector does not understand the fisheries policy, the sector will not accept the fisheries policy.
 - when the sector will not accept the fisheries policy, the sector will not and can not comply with the rules of the policy.
 - when the sector will not and can not comply with the rules of the policy, the policy will not succeed.
- Other systems have been discussed over the years.

“Old” fishermen have recommended free fishing as in the good old days. In this way we could get a clear and true picture of the production of the sea.

Other recommendations have concentrated on experiments and trials, which through selectivity and other technical rules could avoid certain stocks and/or juveniles.

And in a few cases clean effort management has been tried out in limited areas and/or limited fisheries.

- Politicians have shown interest in the CFP and its inadequacies, both at national and international level, primarily because the CFP has an inbuilt obligation to discard – if too much is caught or the wrong species are caught, and, to a lesser degree because of upgrading the catch.

In Denmark, Sweden and in the UK the so-called “Faero-model” has been discussed by the politicians, and the political discussions have been followed up by studies and visits to The Faroe Islands.

It all boils down to the question: Could we base our policy on effort management?

This question has been the subject of the Kattegat working group under the North Sea RAC.

The conclusion of the working group is that effort management must be tried, and it must be tried in a sea area which both in terms of stocks, geography and countrywise is “manageable” – thus a trial where there is little to lose, but a lot to gain.

Therefore Kattegat as trial area.

It is a limited area, with a limited number of important fish species, and only three countries have fishing interests, Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

2. PROPOSAL FOR THE KATTEGAT EFFORT SCHEME

2.1. The trial basis

The TAC’s (quotas) for The Kattegat are suspended during the trial period, or are theoretically fixed at so high a level that there will be no output constraints.

Based on historical track records, the shared Skagerrak/Kattegat quotas are split up in a Skagerrak and a Kattegat component, where the Skagerrak component is allocated to the Skagerrak fishery, and the Kattegat component suspended or artificially fixed at a high level, as described above.

2.2. Extent of the trial fisheries.

The trial fisheries must include all vessels wishing to fish in The Kattegat.

This means that all vessels, which – within the national management systems are legally entitled to fish in The Kattegat – in principle may participate in the trials. (in respect of the overall effort limitations – see 2.9.).

The working group does not consider it necessary to establish specific rules for coastal fisheries or fisheries in coastal areas.

2.3. Time-frame for the trial fisheries.

The trials commence on the 1. January 2006.

The trials run for a period of 5 years to make it possible to gain management experience and experience on data collection and stock development over a number of years.

It is foreseen that adjustments can be made from year to year, during the 5 year period.

2.4. Fisheries covered by the trials.

In principle all fisheries in The Kattegat are to be managed by effort only but a segmentation might be made based on fishery (types of species), or based on types of gear, and/or gear characteristics.

2.5. Initial allocation of effort (days-at-sea).

Each vessel is a priori allocated a fixed number of days-at-sea per month, e.g. 15 days-at-sea per month. (overall effort limitations must be taken into account – see 2.9.).

During the 15 days-at-sea the vessel may fish and land the catches without quantity restrictions.

Days-at-sea are defined as in the cod recovery plans.

Days-at-sea rights in other sea areas are deducted pro rata according to the number of months the vessel participates in the fishery in The Kattegat if the vessel spends more days in The Kattegat than its historic track record. (Reference year/s?) or can the system be coupled with the general days-at-sea scheme?

2.6. Signing up periods

Vessels may sign up for 3 months: January-March, April-June, July-September, October-December.

A vessel must sign up for a 3 months period, at the latest 2 weeks before the period commences. A later signing up is not possible.

A vessel may leave The Kattegat after 1 or 2 months of a 3 months period, provided that it has not used more days than the number corresponding to the period it has stayed in The Kattegat. A vessel can not reenter in a 3 months period if it has left.

2.7. Addition of days.

A vessel may add the days inside the defined 3 months periods in order to obtain better fishing (weather, viability, prices).

2.8. Specific rules relating to cod recovery.

The working group does not consider it necessary to introduce specific measures relating to cod recovery but stresses:

- **that an overall effort reduction will be fixed (see 2.9) resulting in an overall lowering of the effort in The Kattegat, benefiting all fish stocks and the marine environment as a whole**
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- **that vessel-specific measures may be introduced from year 2 (see 3).**

2.9. Overall reductions in effort.

Data on total effort in The Kattegat for the different fisheries has been/will be collected for the fishing year 2004. Based on the data (in kW days-at-sea) a reduction factor will be decided, and the individual member states will allocate the remaining kW days-at-sea to their vessels and monitor the use of the days.

(The reduction factor has still to be discussed in the working group – the discussion will take place when the full kW figures are available)

2.10. Closed areas – real time closures.

A system of real time closed areas will be put in place in order to protect juveniles.

The real time closure system will function as follows: (see also 2.14)

- **A vessel observing an abundance of juveniles in an area will report the observation to the national Monitoring Committee.**
- **The national Monitoring Committee will contact other national vessels in the area and inform the other national Monitoring Committees who will do the same**
- **.....in order to determine the area where there are too many juveniles to continue fishing.**
- **The area defined will be totally closed by the international (North Sea RAC Steering Committee) for 3 weeks, and thereafter automatically reopened for fishing.**
- **The decision to close an area must be taken within 2 days.**
- **A area can be reclosed after the 3 weeks, should there still be too high a concentration of juveniles.**

The fishery pattern in the Kattegat must be analysed in order to determine whether pre-defined areas for real time closures is an option.

2.11. Restrictions

Vessels using towed gears are restricted by a one-net rule.

2.12. Scientific monitoring.

Vessels are obliged to take scientific observers onboard.

2.13. Control and monitoring.

All vessels of more than 10 meters must accept to use surveillance equipment.

2.14. Supervising and running the trial fisheries.

At national level:

A Monitoring Committee will be established comprising representatives from the national authorities – science, management, control -, from the sector organisations (fishermen's associations, PO's) as well as other stakeholders (WWF, consumers etc.)

At international level:

A Steering Committee will be established under the auspices of the North Sea RAC comprising representatives from the affected member states, the commission etc.

3.0 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS TO THE SCHEME.

Whereas the first year will have to be based on an equal number of days per months to all participating vessels this does not necessarily have to be the case for the future years, where a differentiation might be made in the number of days-at-sea according to the cod-share of the total catches.

The working group has not discussed the possible future developments.

4.0. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

- **ADVANTAGES OF AN EFFORT SCHEME**

- **The fish which is caught and which fulfils the minimum landing size requirements can legally be landed and traded. This means a considerable REDUCTION IN DISCARDS (and no unreported landings!)**
- **The overall fishing effort in the area will be reduced benefiting the marine environment and the fish stocks.**
- **The fish stocks will be harvested according to their real-time potential.**
- **The fishery can be conducted freely within a (limited) number of days.**
- **The fishery can be planned better and become more viable.**
- **The scientists will have access to real-time correct data.**
- **The fisheries control will be simplified.**

And

- ***THE FISHERMEN WILL BECOME RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS***

- **OBSTACLES TO AN EFFORT SCHEME**

- **Difficulties to fit an effort scheme in a single sea area into national management schemes.**
- **Possible problems relating to the present rules and regulations of the CFP.**